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1 Introduction
As in all other industrialized countries, the stock of private cars has been increasing rapidly
in Norway during recent decades. In 1960, when automobiles became generally available to
consumers, there were only 225,000 private cars registered in Norway, corresponding to 16
persons per car. In 1987, there were somewhat more than 1.6 million cars, or 2.5 persons per
car. The increase was largely due to growth in income and the demand for the flexibility
provided by car ownership, increased leisure time and increased labour participation among
women. The stock of cars has remained approximately constant since 1987, mainly because
of a general economic slowdown. However, the per capita stock of cars in Norway is fairly
small compared to other western industrialized countries. For instance, the number of persons
per car in the U.S. was 1.8 in 1987; this difference suggests a considerable potential for
growth in the Norwegian stock of cars.
A number of studies analyze private car ownership. Examples from the U.S. include Johnson
(1978), who applies a multinominal logit model to analyze the demand for new and used
cars. Train (1980) applies a nested logit model to estimate car ownership and work-trip mode
choices in San Francisco. Berkovec and Rust (1985) use a nested logit model to analyze
choices between individual makes, models and vintages of passenger vehicles. Mannering and
Winston (1985) develop a dynamic model of automobile demand that accounts for choice of
car quality, type and utilization. Their model enables them to quantify the importance of
brand preference and brand loyalty in U.S. households. In Norway, the Institute for Transport
Economics (TOO has analyzed car use and ownership, for use in transportation planning and
analyses of environmental policy. TOI (1990), presents a model to predict fuel use and
emissions from private travel that is based on a joint model of car ownership and car use
developed by de Jong (1990). The model is used to simulate household's responses to
changes in fixed and variable car costs. Wetterwald (1994) has applied de Jong's econometric
framework of ownership and car use to a different data set than the one used by TOI.
The present study springs from our interest in the consequences of car ownership decisions
for the environment. In particular, we are interested in how costs affect ownership decisions.
While private cars undoubtedly provide large benefits to the individual, they also cause
considerable negative external effects. Traffic congestion, accidents, noise, damage to roads
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and pollution impose substantial costs on society. Apart from the production of cars, which is
quite energy-intensive and, as a result, quite polluting, both the benefits to the individual and
the costs to society are due to the use, rather than the stock, of cars. Certainly, the two are
closely related. The growth in car use, measured in passenger kilemeters, was on average 7.1
percent annually in Norway from 1960-1991; the annual growth in the number of can was
6.8 percent. This correspondence suggests that car ownership decisions are relevant to
environmental outcomes.
The point of departure of the present study is the neoclassical theory of consumer behaviour.
We assume that households have utility functions that are consistent with a Stone-Geary
specification. The household's stock of private cars and car use enter as arguments, as do all
other commodities. Although this framework permits the analysis of both the discrete choice
of how many cars to own and the continuous choice of how much to drive, we restrict our
study to the former, deriving a multinominal logit-type formulation of the ownership
decision. Our empirical findings enable us to study how demographic variables, car costs and
income affect household's decisions regarding how many private cars to own, and how policy
measures like the annual tax on motor vehicles affects the stock of private cars in general as
well as within different groups of households.
Our model is static, in that we only consider the household's stock and not the flow of
private cars. Possible lags in the adjustment of stocks, prices and income expectations, which
may be important in car ownership decisions, are ignored. No distinction is made between
new demand and replacement demand.
Our model specification differs from the one developed by de Jong and applied by
Wetterwald, but our data set is the same as that used by Wetterwald. Consequently, we are
able to examine to some extent whether the results obtained by Wetterwald and de Jong
depend on their empirical specification. Furthermore, our model allows for the option of
owning two and three cars, whereas the de Jong and Wetterwald studies only consider the
binary choice of owning a single car or not owning a car.
The paper is organised as follows: the car ownership model is outlined in chapter 2; chapter
3 gives details of the econometric specification; data and results are presented in chapter 4.
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2 The car ownership model
We rely on the neoclassical theory of consumer behaviour, in which households maximize
utility subject to a given budget constraint; this approach allows for a consistent analysis of
household's allocation of expenditure between private cars and other consumption goods. We
assume private cars to be one homogeneous good, so as to effectively ignore the great variety
that exists in makes and vintages of cars, displayed by variables such as price, size, and
quality.
More precisely, we assume utility to be a function of two types of goods; private cars and an
aggregate of car use and all other commodities. Both goods yield positive marginal utility.
The household utility function is assumed to have the structure
U(Xj) =Bi* +13 11.8 uln(xi i),	 (1)
where j is the number of private cars, (j=0,1,2,3); X = (x 1 ,x2,....,x.), is a vector of quantities
of all other commodities; Bj* > 0 is utility of owning j cars; p, öij, y are parameters and
E1öij=1. One of the components of X is annual car use. This specification of household utility
implies that households derive utility from having a private car available even if they use it
very little. This is represented by {Bi * } . Even if the car is driven very little, we assume that
car ownership yields some utility and that households will pay just to keep a car available.
The assumption that the utility function depends on ownership is made in the models applied
in the U.S. studies mentioned above but not in de Jong's model in which utility is obtained
from car use only, measured by the annual distance driven.
The budget constraint is
pixi=y-jc,	 (2)
where xi
 is the quantity and p i the price of commodity i and Y is net income. c is the annual
fixed costs per car, and includes annual taxes, insurance, depreciation and interest payments.
Since private cars are assumed to be a single homogenous good, the fixed annual costs of car
ownership are equal for the first, second and third car. The right-hand side of (2) is thus the
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income that remains to be spent on car use and commodities other than cars.
The household's utility maximization problem can be decomposed as if it takes place in two
stages In stage one, the households maximize utility with respect to x i ,..x i, given the number
of cars. Maximizing (1) subject to (2), while keeping j fixed, gives the (conditional on j)
linear expenditure system
13,„xn,(i) 13,,Y,n „,,( Y-fc-T-P iy
	 (3)
where xn,(j) is the demand for good m conditional on the choice of j cars. When positive, the
E7-parameters are commonly interpreted as minimum-required quantities. In general, k7kPk is
the part of income dedicated to fixed expenditure with which no substitution is possible.
Large values of Ekykpk suggest that a small part of the income can be freely allocated between
goods, while small or negative values suggest large possibilities for substitution. The
parameters sum  to unity and thus may be interpreted as constant budget shares, after
minimum expenditure, Eakpk, and the expenditure on private cars have been deducted. Note
that these budget shares are dependent on the number of cars in the household.
Substituting (3) into (1) gives the conditional indirect utility function given j cars
G(Y-jc,p,j)=Bj4-01n(Y-jc-Epy
where
.=B .* +f3E8 ..1n8 -PEAS ..inp .
JJ	 11111
The term PI, i8ii1n8 ii is a constant. The last term of (5) is a weighted mean of the logarithm of
prices of all goods other than cars, and may be interpreted as a price index representing the
marginal cost of living (cf. Deaton and Muellbauer,1987). In our case this marginal cost of
living is dependent on the number of cars owned by the household, reflected by the 8j-
parameters.
In stage two the household chooses the number of cars that maximizes G(Y-jc,p,j), yielding
the greatest overall utility.
(4)
(5)
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3 Econometric specification
In the following we will introduce some further assumptions for the purpose of estimation.
To this point the analysis has referred to an unspecified household; we will now introduce
the subscript n to denote household number n.
The model is estimated on a cross-sectional data set in which all prices are constant.
Accordingly, we cannot identify the budget shares 8j in the last term of (5). We assume that
the net utility from car ownership, B in, has the structure
Bjn 4Xj0 -1-aiZn -Fejn
	 (6)
where Zn is a vector of household characteristics consisting of the number of adults, children
and employed persons in the household, the age of the head of the household, whether the
household has access to a business car or not, and whether they live in a large city or not.
The terms fein 1 are unobservable, stochastic variables representing all factors and aspects of
utility known to household n, but unknown to the observer. These unobservables are assumed
to be identically and independently extreme-value distributed:
P(Ejn y)=exp(-e -3').	 (7)
We further assume that yni has the structure
Y„,=7 0, *1, *Q,	 (8)
where Qn is a vector consisting of the number of children and the number of adults in the
household, and yo * and y* are parameters. The minimum expenditure may then be expressed
as
EP,7„,=IP,Yoi*IQnEPY,*=-70 -31Qn7
	 (9)
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where yo and y are parameters that can be estimated. Note that the components of Q are also
components of Z. The y-parameters measure the effect of size and the composition of the
household on the minimum expenditure.
The conditional indirect utility function can now be expressed as
Gn(Yn -j c ,p tj n) =Vin icin ,	 (10)
where
Vin Ra Jo -fajZn 4-131n(Yn -jnc -7 o --ty Qn).
Choosing the number of cars that yields the greatest overall utility implies that household n
chooses to own j cars if
V. 4E. nax (Vin in	 k kn kn
Let Pin denote the probability of choosing j cars. The assumptions above imply that
v
e J.P. --=-11(V . -fe. =max (V -Fe ))-
fie v,„ 
•in	 in in	 k kn kn
The distributional assumptions about the unobservables imply that the independence from
irrelevant alternatives property holds. This property implies that the ratio of the probabilities
of choosing any two alternatives is independent of the availability or attributes of other
alternatives.
The change in the probability of choosing alternative j, given a change in any of the
regressors, r, is given by
ap. ay. 	 av"in =p f	 .in _v	 ,,,. p \
arn	 in  arn hic arn kn)
(14)
(12)
(13)
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The elasticity of Pin with respect to income is therefore equal to
1
	  EkELyPin4317
	
-
 (Y
	 co-f Y gin)
P kn
Yn --kci o -YQ,i) b
(15)
and the elasticity of Pin with respect to fixed car ownership costs equals
EL P .	 c[ 	
kPkn
( 17„ --icio Qn 	Yn --kc -7 0 Qn) is
	
We define the aggregate elasticity of	 with respect to variable r as
aP	 av.x 
 m r 	in	 p kn
 )rn ar n n 
( 
amn Lt ar,, nn
E P.n Ipin n
The aggregate elasticity of P 	 respect to income is equal to
P1
	 _E 	
yp = 13EnPjni 7n
EL
E (Y C -7 0 -7Q) -1 (1'n --kci -7 0 -1Q„) ]
and the aggregate elasticity of P 	 respect to fixed car ownership costs is equal to
i c L-
r i 
	-; 	
kP k„
nc --1 0
-1Q) (Yn
-lcc -70 -1Q)
	EL CI j.=	
The elasticities defined in (15) and (16) measure the percentage change in household n's
probability of choosing j cars, brought about by a one percent change in household n's
income, or in the average fixed costs associated with car ownership. The elasticities given by
(18) and (19) measure the percentage change in the total number of households having j cars
from one percent change in each household's income.
EP.
n in
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
EnPjn
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Finally, let A denote the total number of private cars owned by the households. The elasticity
of the expected total number of cars with respect to variable r is equal to
P .jEn 	 rn
J= 1 	Jr
El rE(A)=	 nr i. liEnP in
(20)
4 Data and empirical results
The data used are from the Norwegian Expenditure Survey 1985 (Statistics Norway, 1987),
which was a typical year regarding the stock (if not the flow) of Norwegian private cars. The
data set includes 1555 representative Norwegian households. The number of cars owned and
several household characteristics are included. In our study, the households with net incomes
less than 30000 NOK (8 households only) were excluded from the sample. The remaining
data set consists of 1547 households, of which 361 (23 percent) did not own a car, 926 (60
percent) owned one car, 227 (15 percent) owned two cars, and 33 (2 percent) owned three
cars. We also estimate all models on the restricted sample that remains after the three car
households are dropped from the sample; one of the models is also estimated on the
restricted sample of households that either own a single car or do not own a car.
The explanatory variables entering the utility function are:
- Net household income measured in Norwegian kroner;
- Average annual fixed costs of private cars, equal to 9204 NOK. This equals fixed costs in
one car owning households, as used in TOI (1990) and Wetterwald (1994). Fixed costs is
calculated using Budget Survey data, with some exogenous data, and includes for instance
insurance, annual taxes on cars, depreciation and interest payments;
- The number of adult persons in the household;
- The number of children less than eighteen years of age in the household;
- The age of the head of the household;
- The number of employed persons in the household;
- A dummy taking the value one if the household has access to a business car;
- A dummy taking the value one if the household lives in Oslo, Bergen or Trondheim; the
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three largest cities in Norway. This vrable may be interpreted as a proxy for the availability
of public transportation, which is far better in large cities than in rural and sparsely populated
areas.
Table 1 displays summary statistics for the variables used.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Subsample of households
with less than three cars
Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.	 Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max
No. of cars	 0.956	 0.681	 0	 3	 0.911	 0.617	 0	 2
Net income (1000 NOK)	 141	 68 30 588	 139	 66 30 588
No. of adults	 2.050	 0.764	 1	 7	 2.025	 0.742	 1	 7
No. of children	 0.769	 1.048
	 0	 8	 0.768	 1.051	 0	 8
No. of employed	 1.267
	 0.933
	
0	 5	 1.234	 0.904	 0	 5
Age of head	 47.840 17.003	 18	 89	 47.886	 17.108	 18	 89
Dummy for business car	 0.038	 0.192	 0	 1	 0.030	 0.194	 0	 1
Dummy for big city	 0.167	 0.373	 0	 1	 0.170	 0.376	 0	 1
Empirical results
The model given by (11) and (13), (model A), was estimated by the maximum likelihood
method. In addition, alternative specifications of the utility function were also estimated. In
model B, the fixed element Ek'YkPk is assumed to be independent of the size and composition
of the household, y=0, y#0. In model C, all y-parameters are assumed to be zero. The last
model, D, is equivalent with C with the exception that the effect of the remaining income on
utility is allowed to vary between the alternatives. The 3-parameter is accordingly alternative-
specific. The models A, B and C are nested, as are C and D. The nested models are tested
by likelihood ratio tests to check which one is best.
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As a measure of goodness of fit we will use the "pseudo-R2" (cf. Maddala, 1983, pp 37-41),
given by
2L- .
N
pseudo -R 2 .=	 2
1 _:-
(21)
where Lo is the value of the likelihood function when all parameters except the constant term
are set equal to zero, L is the value obtained when the estimated parameters are inserted and
N is the number of households in the sample.
The "remaining income" variable (Y-jc) is the only explanatory variable that is alternative-
specific. The other variables are household-specific only, and normalization is thus required.
Without any loss of generality we set all alternative-specific parameters for the "no-car"
alternative to zero: ocoo=a0=0.
Estimated coefficients, t-statistics, the value of the log-likelihood functions and "pseudo-R2 "
are shown in Tables 2-5. If the unobserved heterogeneity in the population is not too large,
we should obtain approximately the same estimates when we apply the conditional likelihood
function given that the households have no more than two cars, and given that the
households have no more than one car. The right hand side of Tables 2-4, and the middle
column of Table 5 display the results from the corresponding conditional maximum
likelihood procedure, given that households have no more than two cars. The right column of
Table 5 displays the results when the sample is restricted to households owning one car or
not owning a car. We see that the parameters estimated from these sub-samples are close to
the ones obtained by the full maximum likelihood procedure. This suggests that the
independence from irrelevant alternatives assumption holds for our sample.
The likelihood-ratio test statistics of model A versus model B, and A versus C imply that
model A is significantly better than both B and C. Model B is no better than C. Furthermore,
the hypothesis that the n-parameters are equal cannot be rejected, as model D is no better
than model C. Also, according to the pseudo-R 2, all these models explain car ownership
decisions about equally well.
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Table 2. Coefficients, t-values, log-likelihood values and pseudo-R 2, model A.
Model A: V . 	+ ajZ + [31n(Y-jc-N-10)
Full Sample	 Restricted sample* )
1 car	 2 cars	 3 cars	 1 car	 2 cars
7.5316 8.900 7.9892 7.4712 8.2749
(6.9138) (2.2844) (2.8195) (6.5206) (4.0034)
-0.9173 -0.8177 -0.7606 -0.9005 -0.7921
(-4.1312) (-2.4990) (-1.6604) (-3.9683) (-2.3685)
0.2212 0.0674 -0.0973 0.2067 0.0446
(1.4269) (0.3079) (-0.2934) (1.2850) (0.1945)
-0.0329 -0.0411 -0.0702 -0.0326 -0.0408
(-6.0730) (-5.3171) (-3.5322) (-6.0037) (-5.2397)
-0.5936 -1.1255 -1.9075 -0.5921 -1.1572
(-3.0820) (-3.8728) (-2.3943) (-3.0742) (-3.96M)
-1.6425 -2.8789 -31.9913 -1.6424 -2.8867
(-4.9481) (-4.7941) (-4.9513) (-4.8011)
0.2770 0.6943 1.4105 0.2797 0.6585
(2.2903) (4.0780) (5.0452) (2.2978) (4.1201)
73.5797 72.7493
(2.5200) (2.3877)
5884. 5744.
(0.2565) (0.2359)
-69980. -69052.
(-3.9897) (-3.8563)
7939. 6837.
(0.9701) (0.7608)
18.6189 19.4254 20.2425 18.3843 19.1991
0.0364 -0.0247 -0.0007 -1.7027 -1.9348
-1563 -1404
-1171 -1064
0.46 0.43
ao
a adults
a children
a age
a city
a business
a employed persons
"Yo
t
y adults
t
y children
av/ar
r=adults
r=children
Log Lo
Log L
Pseudo R2
*) Sample of households that own no more than two cars.
To conclude, model A is preferred. However, as we will see below, model A has some rather
peculiar features, as do B and D. Accordingly, we will only give a brief discussion of these
models before we turn to model C, as model C is more intuitive than A and is preferred to B
and D according to the likelihood-ratio tests.
Consider first model A, and the estimated parameters reported in Table 2. Note that in
models B, C and D, the effects of changes in the number of children or adults on utility are
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Table 3. Coefficients, t-values, log-likelihood values and pseudo R 2, model B.
Model B: Vi = ajo + ajZ + f31n(Y-jc-70)
Full Sample	 Restricted sample* )
1 car	 2 cars 3 cars	 1 car	 2 cars
4.0249 3.0776 1.3719 4.0606 3.1411
(7.0193) (3.0831) (0.8687) (6.7940) (3.0033)
0.1094 0.5902 0.8442 0.1016 0.5664
(0.8047) (3.2794) (2.7682) (0.7435) (3.1216)
0.2105 0.0056 -0.2148 0.2095 0.0043
(1.9615) (0.0427) (-0.8549) (1.9420) (0.0326)
-0.0293 -0.0382 -0.0682 -0.0292 -0.0380
(-5.6666) (-4.9627) (-3.3832) (-5.6286) (-4.9054)
-0.5696 -1.1110 -1.9345 -0.5737 -1.1517
(-3.0079) (-3.8424) (-2.4176) (-3.0248) (-3.9608)
-1.5741 -2.8109 -23.4131 -1.5735 -2.8177
(-4.7896) (-4.6389) (-4.7841) (-4.6452)
0.2455 0.6053 1.3924 0.2428 0.6150
(2.0039) (3.7285) (4.9247) (1.9682) (3.7451)
23.3866 23.5702
(3.5016) (3.3843)
-17123 -16800
(-1.3059) (-1.2749)
-1191 -1082
0.44 0.41
ao
t
a adults
t
a children
t
a age
t
a city
t
a business car
t
a employed persons
t
R
t
'to
t
Log L
Pseudo R2
*) Sample of households that own no more than two cars.
given by the corresponding a-parameters. In model A, by contrast, the number of children
and adults enters the utility function both in the minimum-expenditure term and in the term
representing the net utility from car ownership. The combined effect on utility from a change
in these variables is reported in the lower part of Table 2.
Although a formal test has not been conducted, the values of the a-parameters do not seem
significantly different across alternatives.
The results of estimating model A suggests that the net utility of car ownership decreases
with the number of adults; this may be because the parameter measures the effect of the
marginal cost of living as well as the utility of car ownership. A more puzzling result is that
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Table 4. Coefficients, t-values. log-likelihood values and pseudo R 2, model D.
Model D: Vi = ajo + ajZ + f3j1n(Y-jc)
Full Sample
	
Restricted Sample
No car 1 car 2 cars 3 cars	 No car	 1 car	 2 cars
-5.2251 -9.1443 -16.6729 -4.1122 -7.5197
0.7551 0.8592 1.1393 -0.5867 -0.6991
0.0652 0.5968 0.8350 0.0654 0.5822
0.4551 3.2882 2.6854 0.4567 3.2031
0.1989 0.0222 -0.2011 0.2011 0.0235
1.8240 0.1705 -0.7990 1.8377 0.1795
-0.0298 -0.0372 -0.0667 -0.0295 -0.0368
-5.6925 48304 -3.2643 -5.6345 -4.7661
-0.5855 -1.0998 -1.9286 -0.5872 -1.1375
-3.0678 -3.8055 -2.4029 -3.0757 -3.9177
-1.5788 -2.7918 -31.6657 -1.5758 -2.7933
-4.7697 -4.5949 -4.7643 45975
0.2058 0.6223 1.3960 0.2117 0.6398
1.5755 3.7696 4.8413 1.6169 3.8685
9.7486 10.4855 10.6534 11.0948 10.6096 11.2556 11.3859
1.9681 2.3672 2.5613 2.7553 2.1040 2.4949 2.6853
-1190.91 -1082.51
0.44 0.41
*) Sample of households that own no more than two cars.
the number of adults in the household reduces the size of the minimum expenditure 'yQ. The
total effect on utility is positive. The estimate of the constant term yo is not significant. The
number of children in the household does not significantly affect either the net utility of car
ownership or the fixed element Q.
In model B, shown in Table 3, the constant term a is significant only for the one and two car
choices. In contrast to the results of model A, net utility of car ownership increases with the
number of adults in the household, but the parameter related to the one-car choice is not
significantly different from zero. As in model A, the number of children increases the net
utility of one or two cars, and reduces the net utility of owning three cars. The parameter
intended to measure the minimum expenditure is negative, making a meaningful
interpretation of this term no longer possible. The estimate is, however, not significantly
different from zero.
ao
a adults
a children
a age
a city
a business cars
a employed persons
Log L
Pseudo R2
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In model D, shown in Table 4, the alternative-specific 13 - p arame te rs are, as was pointed out
earlier, not significantly different. Allowing for alternative-specific 3-parameters does alter
the sign of the constant terms ocoi , j=1,2,3.
Model A's counterintuitive finding that the minimum expenditure declines when there are
more adults in the household makes model C preferred to A. Model C is preferred to both B
and D based on the likelihood ratio test statistic. Thus we choose model C as our final
model. Table 5 displays the estimated parameters of model C. Table 6 shows the marginal
effects for model C, calculated at the mean of the regressors, and Table 7 shows the model's
estimated probabilities and elasticities.
In model C, the number of adults in the household significantly increases the net utility of
having two and three cars but has no significant impact on the net utility of having one car.
An increase in the number of adults will increase the probability of owning two or more cars
and decrease the probability of owning one car or being without a car, with the probability of
choosing one car decreasing the most and the probability of choosing two cars increasing the
most.
The net utility of one car increases with the number of children in the household. The effect
of the number of children on the net utility of two and three cars is not significantly different
from zero.'
The older is the head of the household, the less net utility is obtained from car ownership.
The probability of preferring not to own a private car increases with the age of the head of
the household. Accordingly, the probability of owning one or more cars decreases. The result
is as expected and is in accordance with the low frequency of drivers licenses among older
people, and women in particular. The result may not be appropriate for forecasting purposes;
the frequency of drivers licenses will be larger in the future, and one may expect a different
attitude towards cars among future "older" generations. Living in one of Norway's three
largest cities reduces the net utility of car ownership. The probability of choosing two or
more cars would decrease if an average household moved from a rural area to a large city.
The probability of choosing a single car or not to own a car would accordingly increase.
I In earlier versions of the models, the number-of-children variable was split into children younger and older than
twelve years of age, without yielding any significant changes to the results.
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Table 5. Coefficients, t-values, log-likelihood values and pseudo R2, model C.
Model C: Vi = ajo + ajZ + Pln(Y-jc)
Full sample Restricted sample ) 	Restricted sample -)
1 car	 2 cars	 3 cars	 1 car	 2 cars	 1 car
3.5837 2.1161 -0.0469 3.5883 2.1326 3.6589
(7.4005) (2.8815) (-0.0385) (7.3039) (2.8598) (6.8150)
0.1167 0.6236 0.8955 0.1143 0.6077 0.1011
(0.8586) (3.4968) (2.9638) (0.8384) (3.3941) (0.7195)
0.2218 0.0310 -0.1835 0.2218 0.0309 0.2085
(2.0692) (0.2407) (-0.7348) (2.0612) (0.2392) (1.8926)
-0.0288 -0.0366 -0.0651 -0.0287 -0.0363 -0.0279
(-5.5628) (-4.8138) (-3.2758) (-5.5252) (-4.7618) (-5.2545)
-0.5732 -1.0966 -1.8981 -0.5747 -1.1329 -0.5650
(-3.0300) (-3.8072) (-2.3783) (-3.0350) (-3.9163) (-2.9413)
-1.5583 -2.7637 -23.3958 -1.5587 -2.7711 -1.5663
(-4.7641) (-4.5904) (-4.7639) (-4.5987) (-4.7425)
0.2662 0.6564 1.4593 0.2674 0.6709 0.2315
(2.1831) (4.1306) (5.2326) (2.1836) (4.1980) (1.8379)
15.3532 15.4221 16.2290
(9.1658) (8.9485) (7.8387)
-1192 -1083 -553
0.44 0.41 0.39
*) Sample of households that own no more than two cars.
"Sam* of households that either own a single car or do not own a car.
Table 6. Marginal effects in model C, calculated at the sample mean.
Full sample	 Restricted sample ) 	Restricted
sample"
No car 1 car 2 cars 3 cars No car 1 car 	 2 cars	 1 car
aP/az
adults -0.0217 -0.0407 0.0610 0.0014 -0.0214 -0.0361 0.0575 0.0147
children -0.0211 0.0402 -0.0184 -0.0007 -0.0220 0.0397 -0.0177 0.0303
age 0.0033 -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0001 0.0034 -0.0021 -0.0013 -0.0041
city 0.0725 0.0006 -0.0705 -0.0026 0.0748 -0.0023 -0.0726 -0.0822
business cars 0.1980 0.0064 -0.1616 -0.0428 0.1979 -0.0350 -0.1628 -0.2279
employed persons -0.0363 -0.0157 0.0498 0.0023 -0.0373 -0.0127 0.0499 0.0337
*) Sample of households owning no more than two cars
.”Sample of households owning one single car or not owning a car. In this case, the marginal effects on the choice of not owning a car
equals the negative of the effect of the one car choice.
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Again the result is as expected. Public transportation is far more available in the large cities
than in rural areas and distances are smaller.
As expected, access to business cars reduces the net utility of private cars. Increased access
to business cars will increase the probability of preferring not to own a car and to own one
car. The probability of choosing not to own a car increases the most. The probability of
choosing two or more cars more decreases 2 .
The number of employed persons in the household increases the net utility of car ownership.
When the number of employed persons increases, the probability of choosing not to own a
car or to own one car decreases, and the probability of choosing two or more cars increases.
The probability of choosing two cars increases the most'.
In general, the probability of choosing one car is less sensitive to changes in the number of
employed persons in the household, access to business cars or whether the household lives in
the cities or not, than are the other choices.
Table 7 displays estimated probabilities and elasticities of the choice probabilities with
respect to income as given by (15), calculated at the sample mean, and estimated
probabilities and aggregate elasticities as given by (18) for the whole population and for
different groups of households. The households are grouped according to level of income.
Income group one containe households with incomes less than the 25 percent income
quantile, group two containe households with incomes between the 25 percent quantile and
the median, group three containe households with incomes between the median and the 75
percent quantile, and group four containe households with incomes above the 75 percent
income quantile. Note that in this particular model, elasticity of costs equals the negative of
the elasticity of income. Only the latter is reported.
2None of the households in the sample that owned three cars had access to a business car. The standard error of the
corresponding parameter is, accordingly, infinitely large, and it is not obvious whether the parameter should be
included or not.
'Because of the fairly high correlation between the number of adults and the number of employed persons in a
household, the models were estimated without the latter variable. This caused only minor changes in the results.
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The estimated choice probabilities for the whole sample equal the observed frequencies in the
sample. This is a property that follows from the model and the ML-method (cf. Maddala,
1983). As the model is estimated on the full sample, the estimated choice probabilities within
each income group differ slightly from the actual frequencies within the same group. The
difference between the observed frequencies and estimated probabilities is quite marginal,
and Table 7 displays the latter only.
As the table shows, the aggregate mean income elasticities are in line with those calculated at
the sample mean. The elasticities calculated at the sample mean, for the population as a
whole and for households with income above the median, shows that the probability of
choosing two cars or more will increase when income increases or costs are reduced. The
income elasticities of second and third cars are all increasing with income. What may be
more puzzling is that an income increase would, according to this model, cause the
probability of choosing one car to be reduced in the households with income above the
median. However, one likely outcome of an income increase is that households without a car
become one car households, one car households become two car households and two car
households add a third car. If the last two effects are greater than the first, the mean
probability of choosing one car will decrease; as is the case in the richest two groups of
households in our study. The effect is particularly strong among the households with the
highest income. As the upper part of Table 7 shows, the effect of an income increase on the
(total) mean probability of choosing one car is positive. Furthermore, the one-car-elasticities
are quite small. In the aggregate, the mean probability of choosing one car will increase by
1.2 percent if income increases by 10 percent. The mean probability within the
two richest groups of households would fall by less than two percent. According to these
estimates, ownership of one car in households with incomes above the 25 percent income
quantile, is fairly inelastic with respect to income and costs, suggesting that these households
consider the first car as a necessity. The second and third car may be classified as luxury
goods, in particular among households with low incomes. This effect is less striking for high
income households, and for the populationas a whole.
Table 8 shows the elasticity for different groups of households, of the expected number of
cars with respect to incomes and fixed annual car costs as given by equation (20). The
elasticity of the expected total number of cars is 0.41. Assuming that this elasticity is also
valid for a larger interval of costs, the effect of the currently debated abolition of annual
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Table 7. Income elasticities and probabilities calculated at the sample mean, for the population
as a whole and for different income groups. Model C. Full sample.
No car	 1 car	 2 cars	 3 cars
Sample mean elasticities
pin	 0.73
	
0.13
	
0.01
ElyPjn 	 -0.04	 1.19	 2.26
Aggregate elasticities
Total
Pi 	0.23	 0.60	 0.15	 0.02
ElyPi
	-0.94	 0.12	 0.82	 1.17
Income group 1
Pi
	0.55	 0.42	 0.02	 0.01
ElyPi
	-0.89	 1.04	 3.34	 6.28
Income group 2
Pi
	0. 1	 0.68	 0.10	 0.01
ElyPi 	-1.12	 0.09	 1.51	 3.04
Income group 3
Pi
	0.10	 0.69	 0.19	 0.02
ElyPi
	-0.98	 -0.14	 0.88	 1.98
Income group 4
Pi
	0.07	 0.59	 0.28	 0.06
ElyPi
	-0.78	 -0.19	 0.39	 0.80
taxes on cars may be calculated. At present, the annual tax on motor vehicles amounts to
approximately 10 percent of fixed annual car costs. According to our model, abolishing this
tax would increase the number of cars in Norway by around 4 percent. Most of this growth
would occur among the low income households. The poorest 25 percent of the households
would increase their stock of private cars by 12 percent, while the richest 25 percent would
increase their stock of cars by 2 percent only.
According to our model, the number of cars owned by households without children would
increase by 5.6 percent if the annual tax on private cars is abolished, while the corresponding
figure among the households with children less than 18 years of age is 2.6 percent. Further,
there is no difference between households living outside or in the largest cities. The
distributional impacts of abolishing the tax, between rural and urban areas and between
families with and without children, may thus be quite different than what is expected by
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Table 8. Income elasticities of the expected number of cars with respect to income.
Total
	
0.41
Income group 1
	
1.21
Income group 2
	
0.46
Income group 3
	
0.29
Income group 4
	
0.20
Households without children 	 0.56
Households with children less than 18 years of age	 0.26
Households living in Oslo. Bergen. Trondheim	 0.41
Households living outside the cities	 0.41
One person households 	 0.94
Two adults	 0.38
More than two adults	 0.27
advocates of the policy. Furthermore, the growth in the stock of cars will be largest in the
one person households and lowest in the households with more than two adults.
The structure of model C is only consistent with the special case with yi = 0 for all i (Cobb-
Douglas). However, since we do not estimate the full structure of indirect utility as a
function of prices, model C is in fact also consistent with the PIGLOG class of demand
functions. It is of interest that model C also has the same structure as the one obtained by
Van Praag (1991), who conducted a series of individual laboratory type experiments to
determine the utility of income.
As was mentioned in the introduction, Wetterwald (1994) uses the same data set to analyse
car ownership and use. Wetterwald essentially applies a model developed by de Jong (1990),
in which the household's ownership decision is restricted to own a single car or not to own a
car. This restriction is evidently unrealistic. The result turns out not to be robust with respect
to this simplification. While Wetterwald obtains an elasticity of the probability of ownership
with respect to income of about 0.37, the corresponding figure in table 7 is 0.12. To check
that this difference in results does not depend crucially on the difference in econometric
specification, we have also computed the elasticity for the case when the choice is restricted
to own a single car or not to own a car. The income elasticity that follows from this
restricted model is about 0.35, which is very close to Wetterwald's result. This seems to
indicate that the difference in econometric specification does not matter much for the
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discrepancy in results between our model and the model proposed by de Jong.
Predicted frequencies
Above we computed the pseudo-R 2 as a measure of goodness of fit. Another measure is
obtained by using the model to simulate behaviour and record the fraction of correct
predictions. We have carried out the following simulation experiment:
We first make predictions by simulating behaviour while ignoring the random disturbances in
the utility function. Second, we simulate behaviour taking account of the disturbances in the
utility function for each household. Consistent with the theory above, these disturbances are
all i.i.d. draws from the extreme value distribution without error terms.
Table 9 shows actual and predicted outcomes, and predicted outcomes in percent of actual
outcomes when the residuals are zero. 67 percent of all predictions we correct. The model
does quite well in predicting the choice of owning one car, as 90 percent of actual outcomes
are predicted. The remainder of households that own one car are predicted to choose not to
own a car by the model. About 50 percent of the choices not to own a car are correctly
predicted. The model does rather poorly when it comes to predicting the ownership of two or
three cars.
Table 9. Actual and predicted number of cars.
Predicted
	
Per cent
Actual	 0	i	 2	 3	 Total	 correct
0	 184	 171	 5	 1	 361	 51
1	 76	 830	 19	 1	 926	 90
2	 1	 202	 21	 3	 227	 9
3	 0	 14	 14	 5	 33	 15
Total	 261	 1217	 59	 10	 1547	 67
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Table 10. Actual and predicted number of cars with error term drawn from the extreme value
distribution.
Actual
0
1
2
3
Total
Predicted
	0 	 1	 2	 3
	
174	 163	 22	 2
	
160	 621	 132	 13
	
22	 128	 64	 13
1	 13	 16	 3
	
357	 925	 234	 31
Per cent
	
Total	 correct
	3 	 48
	
926	 67
	
227	 28
	
33	 9
	
1547	 56
Predicted
Actual	 0	 1	 2	 3
0	 172	 165	 21	 3
1	 149	 627	 135	 15
2	 19	 132	 64	 12
3	 1	 16	 11	 5
Total	 341	 940	 231	 35
Per cent
	
Total	 correct
	36 	 48
	
926	 68
	
227	 28
	
33	 15
	
1547	 56
Predicted
Actual	 0	i	 2	 3
0	 191	 141	 26	 3
1	 150	 631	 137	 8
2	 21	 131	 66	 9
3	 1	 18	 6	 8
Total
	 363	 921	 235	 28
Per cent
	
Total	 correct
	36 	 53
	
926	 68
	
227	 29
	
33	 24
	
1547	 58
Predicted
Actual
	 0	 1	 2	 3
0	 182	 155	 22	 2
1	 174	 596	 143	 13
2	 25	 141	 51	 10
3	 0	 16	 9	 8
Per cent
	
Total	 correct
	36 	 40
	
926	 64
	
227	 22
	
33	 24
Total
	 381	 908	 225	 33	 1547	 54
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Table 10 displays the predictions that result when the random disturbances are taken into
account. This method corresponds to the theory in section 3, in which we made the
assumption that there is a stochastic term, known only to the households, that affects
household utility and thus ownership decisions. We implement the simulation by making, for
each household, four independent draws from the extreme value distribution for each
alternative.
As Table 10 shows, the fraction of outcomes correctly predicted is somewhat reduced when
the random disturbances are accounted for. Between 54 and 58 percent of total predictions
are correct. Predictions of single car outcomes are still most successful; between 64 and 68
percent of these outcomes are correct. The differences in the ability to predict the different
choices are smaller than in our first simulation. Predictions of the choice of not owning a car
are slightly improved when the random residuals are included, and predictions of the two and
three cars choices are substantially improved. The tendency to over-predict single-car
ownership is reduced when the residuals are included.
As expected (cf. Maddala, 1983) the sum of predictions of each alternative is very close to
the number of observations in the sample of the same outcome. On average, the predicted
frequency of each choice is equal to the actual frequency. Comparing predictions to actual
choices indicates that the effects of unobserved aspects of utility are substantial.
5 Conclusions
We have developed and estimated a model of household's car ownership decisions based on
microeconomic theory. The main conclusions from our estimations are as follows:
Income and cost elasticities are very small for the choice of owning one car in households
with average income. The elasticities decrease with income levels, and increase with the
number of cars.
23
Second, reduced fixed annual car costs or increases in income will give rise to an increase in
the number of private cars in Norway. If the fixed costs of car ownership are reduced by 10
percent, the number of cars will grow by approximately 4 percent.
The model's performance in predicting the sample outcomes is quite good. The model
predicts fairly well the ownership of one car and the choice of not owning a car well; its
performance in predicting ownership of two or three cars is worse.
There are some important shortcomings in our approach. For example, cars are treated as a
homogeneous good, which is obviously not realistic. Both fixed and variable car costs are
clearly endogenous variables, a complication which is ignored in this paper. Accordingly,
data on costs should not enter the utility function in the simple way adopted by the models
above. To develop a model where cars are treated as a heterogenous good is an important
challenge for future research. Finally, the model should be extended to a intertemporal
setting.
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